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Abstract
This paper explores in what circumstances patent owners can be ex-
pected to join unilaterally a patent pool. We develop a simple model in
which owners of patents reading on a standard grant licences to competing
manufacturers. Manufacturers must sink a ￿xed cost to enter the mar-
ket for standard compliant products, and are thus exposed to a hold up
when royalties are set after their entry. We show that the formation of
non-cooperative patent pools nearly always fails if it takes place once man-
ufacturers have incurred ￿xed costs - as is usually the case. By contrast,
allowing the formation of patent pools ex ante facilitates the emergence
of stable non-cooperative patent pools. Such ex ante pools yield lower
prices and higher licensing pro￿ts than ex post patent pools would. We
discuss the policy implications of these results concerning the credibilty
of licensing commitments required by standard setting bodies.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the number of patents reading on technology norms
such as the DVD, MPEG or WCDMA standards has increased dramatically
(Simcoe, 2005). Such patents, belonging to various owners, are selected during
the standard setting process and licensed to manufacturers once the standard
is set. As their number was growing, their licensing has raised twofold issues.
First, double-marginalization ine¢ ciently raises the royalties charged to man-
ufacturers. Patent owners tend to charge excessive royalties when they grant
licences separately. This induces lesser demand for standard-compliant prod-
ucts, but also lower pro￿ts for the patent owners themselves (Shapiro, 2000).
The other problem deals with patent hold-up. Licensing usually takes place
once manufacturers have sunk irreversible costs to adopt the standard. Patent
owners can thus charge higher royalties, thereby creating a climate of de￿ance
that may deter the adoption of standards in the long term (Farrell et al., 2007;
Lemley & Shapiro, 2007).
Both issues have prompted answers that do not seem fully e⁄ective. Creating
patent pools which license patents jointly is a way to ￿x double marginalization.
Yet patent pool formation often fails in practise because of free riding. It is
indeed more pro￿table for a patent owner to hold out its patents, and take
advantage of the existence of the pool to raise its own royalties (U.S. DoJ &
FTC, 2007). To prevent the hold-up problem, standard setting organizations
usually require that owners make early commitments to license their patents
under Resasonable and Non Discriminatory terms. However these commitments
remain vague and di¢ cult to enforce, and several recent cases1 have shed a crude
light on their ine⁄ectivity.
In contrast, we show in this paper that binding licensing commitments are an
e⁄ective way to mitigate both the hold-up and double marginalization problems.
We develop a simple dynamic model that captures both issues. Competing man-
ufacturers of standard compliant products license patents reading on a standard
from k di⁄erent owners. Since adopting a standard entails speci￿c investments
in the technology, we consider that manufacturers must sink a ￿xed cost to
enter the market. If licensing takes place after entry, patent owners can thus
hold-up captive manufacturers and charge them higher royalties. Because of
double marginalization, the royalties increase even more if patent owners set
their royalties separately.
We use this setting to compare two patent pool scenarios. In the ￿rst one the
1The two most commented hold-up cases are Rambus and Qualcomm. Rambus took
advantage of its involvement in the work to standardize random access memory (RAM) to
word its patents in order to make sure that the new standard would infringe them, all the
while leading the other members to believe that it had no patent covering the future standard.
Rambus then sued the users of the standards for violating its IPR. Qualcomm is the biggest
owner of patents reading on the WCDMA wireless communication standard. Broadcom and
￿ve other ￿rms, including Nokia, ￿led a complaint with the European Commission against
Qualcomm for abuse of a dominant position, particularly by refusing to license its patents on
Fair and Reasonable terms as it had pledged to do.
2pool is created once the standard setting process is over, e.g. after manufacturers
have sunk their ￿xed cost. We refer to it as the ex post scenario. The second
scenario corresponds to the ex ante formation of the pool. In this case, we
assume that patent owners can join a pool before the end of the standard setting
process, and that this pool in turn commits on a joint royalty before the entry
of manufacturers. Importantly, we assume that both commitments to join the
pool and to apply the announced royalty are binding.
We study in each scenario in what circumstances patent owners can be ex-
pected to join unilaterally a patent pool. In the ex post scenario, the decision to
join the pool depend on two e⁄ects. On the one hand, mitigation of the double
marginalization problem bene￿ts to all licensors, be they within or outside the
pool. On the other hand, joining a pool implies pro￿t dilution for the patent
holder, since the pool behaves like a unique licensor which pro￿t must be split
between all its members. We ￿nd as expected that the second e⁄ect dominates
the ￿rst one as soon as there are more than two patent owners, such that patent
pools cannot spontaneously emerge.
Besides double margins mitigation and pro￿t dilution, the patent owners￿
decision to join or stay out of an ex ante pool is then a⁄ected by two new
and con￿ icting e⁄ects. On the one hand, ex ante royalty setting creates a
Stackelberg pattern in which the ￿rst mover can set a higher royalty and oblige
followers to lower their royalties. On the other hand, the incentive to lower
royalties to mitigate double margins is reinforced by the incentive to attract
new entrants. We show that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates when the number of
independent licensors is large, such an ex ante pool will always emerge. As the
size of the pool increases, it will however lower its royalties because of the second
e⁄ect. At equilibrium, we show that the existence of the ex ante pool always
results in lower total royalties paid by manufacturers.
These ￿ndings contribute to a growing body of literature on the licensing
of patents reading on technoloy standards. Shapiro (2001) and Gilbert (2004)
have ￿rst pinpointed the double marginalization problem and shown that cre-
ating patent pools is a way to ￿x it. Lerner and Tirole (2004) and Lerner et
al. (2005) show that the potential anticompetitive e⁄ects of patent pools can
be avoided with appropriate provisions. Our work relates more directly to the
papers of Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) and Brenner (2005). Both ￿nd in di⁄erent
settings that the grand coalition of all patent owners cannot emerge as a patent
pool. Our analysis is consistent with their ￿nding and complements it by shed-
ding light on the mechanisms underlying individual hold out strategies in ex
post and ex ante scenarios. The litearture on patent hold-up and standards de-
veloped more recently in the trail of antitrust cases (Swanson & Baumol, 2005;
Farrell et al., 2007; Lemley & Shapiro, 2007). These papers defend the idea
that standard setting bodies should organize ex ante competition between tech-
nologies, such that patent owners commit on royalties re￿ ecting the outcome
of ex ante competition. Our analysis provides a di⁄erent and complementary
interpretation of ex ante royalty setting, which emphasizes the interest of using
binding commitments to set a global royalty that can then be split between
patent owners.
3The rest of the paper is organized in four Sections. We introduce our basic
setting in Section 2. The ex post and ex ante patent pool scenarios are analyzed
in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We conclude and discuss policy implications in
Section 5.
2 General setting
We consider the licensing of a technology standard to ￿rms in a downstream
sector of n manufacturers competing ￿ la Cournot. The standard embodies k
essential patents, each of which belongs to a di⁄erent R&D ￿rm. The man-
ufacturers pay a per unit royalty R for the bundle of the k patents. Before
studying how the level of global royalty is determined, we study as a ￿rst step
the downstream market in order to derive the demand for licenses.
The inverse demand function to manufacturer i writes




The unit production costs of manufacturers are noted c; they are symmetric
and constant. Moreover manufacturers pay the per unit royalty R for using
the technology standard. The program of a manufacturer, given that n ￿rms
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We assume there is an irreversible ￿xed cost E of entry into the downstream
market. This cost corresponds especially to the cost of implementing the stan-
dard. For simplicity we assume further on that E = 1. Given a royalty level R,
￿rms enter into the market until the entry pro￿t is zero, e.g. ￿M (n) = 1. At
free entry equilibrium, the number of manufacturers is thus given by
n = x ￿ R ￿ 1 (1)
It can be checked easily that at free entry equilibrium we have qM = 1. From
n and q we can derive the total production Q and the price P of goods on the
downstream market:
4Q(R) = nqM = x ￿ R ￿ 1 = n (2)
P (R) = c + R + E
We study succesively two patterns of royalty setting and patent pool forma-
tion. In the ￿rst case manufacturers enter the downstream market before the
licensors announce their royalties. Patent owners have then the choice between
joining a unique patent pool, or licensing their patent separately. In the sec-
ond case the patent pool is created before the manufacturers enter the market.
Patent owners then can either join the patent pool, or decide to announce their
royalties ex post.
3 Patent pool created after entry
We assume in this section that all licensing decisions take place after the man-
ufacturers have entered the market for standard-compliant goods. This implies
that the patent owners cannot in￿ uence the entry of manufacturers and must
take their number n as given. In this context, we study whether some patent
owners will agree to form a patent pool in order to set their royalties jointly.
Timing of the game:
1) manufacturers enter the market for standard compliant products
2) patent pool formation
3) the patent pool and the independent licensors set the royalties
3.1 Independent licensors
Let us assume that a set L of l ￿rms ￿x their royalties Ri
l (i 2 L) independently,
while a set P of (k ￿ l) ￿rms join a patent pool and ￿x a joint royalty RP
l ex
post. We study the maximisation pro￿t program of an independent licensor.

























l if i is the patent pool
The patent pool appears as an (l + 1)
th independent licensor. Maximizing














We can now calculate the demand adressed to an independent licensor (in-














Members of the pool share equally the pro￿t made by the pool. Since the
total pro￿t of the pool equals the pro￿t of an independent licensor, it is clear
that for a given l, a pool member always gets less than an independent licensor.















Proposition 1 The pro￿t of an independent licensor is decreasing in l. The
pro￿t of a member of the pool is decreasing in l on
￿
0; 2









Figure 1: Licensing pro￿ts with an ex post patent pool.
6Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. A patent pool helps mitigate the
double marginalization problem, which bene￿ts not only the pool but also inde-
pendent licensors. Conversely, the smaller the pool, the smaller the individual
pro￿t of independent licensors. The e⁄ect of the number of independent licensors
on the pro￿t of a pool member is more subtle. On the one hand, the decrease
in the size of the pool worsens the double marginalization e⁄ect, and hence the
total pro￿t made by the pool. On the other hand it implies that the total pro￿t
of the pool will be split between less members, which tends to rise their indi-
vidual shares. Proposition 1 shows that the ￿rst e⁄ect prevails when the pool is
large while there are few independent licensors (l < 2
3 (k ￿ 1)). In particular, a
patent pool including the grand coalition of all patent owners (l = 0) generates
more individual pro￿ts than the absnece of patent pool (l = k ￿ 1).However,
as the number of independent licensors reaches about two thirds of the patent
owners, the dilution e⁄ect becomes more important, so that one more defection
actually increases the pro￿t of those who stay in the pool when l > 2
3 (k ￿ 1).
3.2 Patent pool formation
Although the formation of a patent pool helps mitigate the double marginal-
ization problem, it may be more pro￿table for an individual patent owner to
stay outside the pool. Indeed, it can thereby bene￿t from the double margins
mitigation enhanced by the pool, without having to share its licensing pro￿ts
with other patent holders. We focus now on this hold-out problem, by studying
the individual incentives of patent owners to join or quit a patent pool.
We study as a ￿rst step whether a pool can form as a Nash equilibrium.
Starting from a situation in which all k patent owners license separately, a
pool will emerge if two patent owners decide to create it, e.g. if ￿P
k￿2 > ￿L
k￿1.
Figure 1 clearly shows that moving away from the situation where all patents
are licensed separately implies a pro￿t increase for those remaining independent
licensors (due to the mitigation of double marginalization) and a net pro￿t loss
for the pool members (due to the dilution e⁄ect). In this context Proposition 2
shows that two patent owners will ￿nd an interest in cooperating only if there
is no independent licensor remaining, e.g. if k = 2.
Proposition 2 Two patent owners will create a pool if k = 2. If k > 2 two
patent owners will never start a pool.
Proof. See Appendix.
It may be exagerately pessimistic to assume that more than two patent
owners cannot coordinate to create a pool. It is more realistic to allow instead
for k￿l patent owners to coalize in order to create a pool, and to check whether
such a coalition can be a Nash equilibrium. Considering a coalition of (k ￿ l)
patent owners, this is the case if an independent licensor prefers to stay out of
the pool (e.g., if ￿L
l < ￿P
l￿1) and, conversely, if a member of the coalition prefers
7to stay in (e.g., if ￿L
l+1 > ￿P
l ). Checking stability for all k > 1 and l < k yields
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If k ￿ 4, there is no Nash proof coalition. If k 2 f2;3g, the
grand coalition is the only Nash proof coalition.
Proof. See Appendix.
A patent pool based on a coalition can be a Nash equilibrium only if there are
less than 2 or 3 patent owners. Otherwise, a coalition of two or more patentees
forming a patent pool is always subject to strategic instability. The stability
of the patent pool with 2 or 3 patent owners is due to the absence or limited
number (one) of independent licensors that may be tempted to free ride on the
others￿e⁄ort to decrease royalties. When k = 3, it is interesting to observe that
two patent owners will not spontaneously start a patent pool because the outside
position of the third patentee is more pro￿table. This problem generalizes when
k > 3: it is always more pro￿table to hold out one￿ s patent instead of joining a
pool of whatever size.
4 Patent pool created before entry
We have seen in the previous Section that patent pools created after the entry of
manufacturers are subject to instability due to patent hold-out, which prevents
their spontaneous formation when there are more than two patent owners. We
show in this Section that the problem of patent pool formation can be ￿xed
if patent owners are allowed to make binding commitments on a joint license
before manufacturers enter the market. Note that since commitments are made
during the standard setting process, patent owners do not contract them with
manufacturers, but with the standard setting body. Accordingly, independent
patent owners are not able to make binding ex ante commitments. As in the
previous Section, we assume that a set L of l ￿rms ￿x their royalties indepen-
dently after the manufacturers have entered the market. However we now let
a set A of (k ￿ l) ￿rms join a patent pool and ￿x a joint royalty RA
l before
manufacturers invest E.
Timing of the game:
1) patent pool formation
2) the patent pool commits on a royalty level
3) manufacturers enter the market for standard compliant products
4) independent licensors set their royalties
4.1 Licensing pro￿ts
We study as a ￿rst step the maximisation pro￿t program of an independent
licensor given RA
l . The independent licensor i 2 L ￿xes its royalty after the
entry of manufacturers. Hence it perceives the number of manufacturers as
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x if l = k
(5)





is an endogenous variable for the patent
pool when it commits on a royalty RA
l before the entry of manufacturers. By
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if l 2 [1;k ￿ 1] (6)
Noting that n =
x￿(k+1)
x if l = k and using (6) in (4) in turn imply that the
royalty R
L
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k+1 if l = k
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Observe that when l 2 [1;k ￿ 1], its value does not a⁄ect the equilibrium
royalty of the pool and of independent licensors in the same way. To ensure
that non-negative royalty R
A






are possible in this case, we
will assume further on that x > k + 1.
Hypothesis 1: x > k + 1
It is interesting to observe that under Hypothesis 1 we have R
A
k￿1 = (x ￿ k)=2 >
RP
k￿1 = x=(k + 1). In other terms, a one-member patent pool charges a higher
royalty when it is able to commit ex ante. This asymmetry actually re￿ ects a
Stackelberg pattern allowing the ￿rst mover to preempt a larger share of the li-
censing pro￿ts. Consider in turn the grand-coalition patent pools in the ex post
and ex ante scenarios. We can check easily that R
A
0 = (x ￿ 1)=2 < RP
0 = x=2.
9The grand coordination thus charges lower royalties in the ex ante scenario.
Given that the double marginalization problem is completely solved in both
scenarios, the lower royalty charged by the ex ante pool is due to its incentive
to promote the entry of more manufacturers. These Stackelberg and Entry Pro-
motion e⁄ects paly in opposite directions. We will see below that their respective
weighs depend on the size of the ex ante patent pool.
Using (5), (6) and (7), we can now reexpress the pro￿t ￿L
l and ￿A
l of an
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4(l + 1)
if l 2 [1;k ￿ 1] (9)
Comparing these pro￿ts yields the following results:
Proposition 4 The pro￿t shapes are the following:
￿ The pro￿t ￿L
l of an independent licensor is decreasing in l on [0;k ￿ 1].
￿ When x > k
k￿1 (k + 1), the pro￿t ￿A
l is inverse-U-shaped in l on [0;k ￿ 1].
It reaches a minimum in l =
(k￿1)x+1+k
2x￿k￿1 .
￿ When x ￿ k
k￿1 (k + 1), the pro￿t ￿A
l of a member of the pool is decreasing
in l on [0;k ￿ 1].
Corollary 5 When x > k























Corollary 6 When x ￿ k







l for all l 2 [0;k ￿ 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below. Figure 2 corresponds to
the condition x > k
k￿1 (k + 1) denoting a large market for standard compliant
products. Observe ￿rst the di⁄erence between l = k and l = k ￿ 1. In the ￿rst
10case all owners grant independent licences ex post, which maximizes the double
marginalization e⁄ect. If one of them moves ex ante, it will bene￿t from a ￿rst
mover (Stackelberg) advantage and charge a higher royalty, thereby obliging
the other licensors to decrease their royalties (with a net increasing e⁄ect on the
sum of all royalties). The ￿rst mover thus increases its pro￿t while the others
lose money (since individual royalties are strategic substitutes). There is always
an incentive to start forming a patent pool.
If l 2 [0;k ￿ 1], we can ￿rstly observe that the pro￿t of an independent
licensor is still decreasing in the number of such licensors. The pro￿t of a
member of the pool is also inverse-U-shaped in l. This shape re￿ ects the balance
between the gain from double margins mitigation and entry promotion on the
one hand, and the opportunity cost associated with pro￿t dilution on the other
hand. Contrary to the ex post case, note that the pro￿t of a pool member
now crosses ￿L
l at its minimum. At this point l, the pro￿t of all licensors, be
they within or outside the pool, is equal to their pro￿ts in absence of a pool.
This corresponds to a balance between the royalty-increasing (Stackelberg) and
royalty decreasing e⁄ects of the patent pool. Beyond that threshold (e.g., for
l < l), the pro￿t of both independent licensors and members of the pool increases
in the size of the pool, thereby denoting that the royalty decreasing e⁄ects
dominate.
Figure 2: Licensing pro￿ts with an ex ante patent pool when x > k
k￿1 (k + 1).
Figure 3 corresponds to the condition k + 1 ￿ x ￿ k
k￿1 (k + 1) denoting a
small market for standard compliant products. Both ￿L
l and ￿A
l are decreasing
in l 2 [0;k ￿ 1], for the condition implies that l > k ￿ 1. Figure 3 thus corre-










11Figure 3: Licensing pro￿ts with an ex ante patent pool when x < k
k￿1 (k + 1).
We explore more systematically the formation of ex ante patent pools in the
next Subsection.
4.2 Patent pool formation
We study now whether a patent pool will emerge if it is created ex ante. We
establish as a ￿rst step that a grand coalition of all patent owners cannot be a
Nash stable ex ante patent pool.
Proposition 7 For k ￿ 4, the grand coalition is not Nash proof. For k = 3, it
is Nash proof i⁄ x ￿ 3. For k = 2 it is always Nash proof.
Proof. See Appendix.
As with ex post patent pool, Proposition 5 establishes that a grand patent
pool cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. The instability is due to the in-
centives for individual patent owners to hold-out their patents and free ride on
the low royalties charged by the pool. In this context, the grand patent pool is
stable only if there is no or limited possibility of free riding on the pool, e.g. if
k = 2 or k = 3.
Although the grand patent pool can never emerge as a Nash equilibrium for
k > 3, the following result establishes that a pool will always emerge if it can
be created ex ante.
Proposition 8 When the grand coalition is not Nash Proof, there a unique
Nash proof ex ante coalition de￿ned by l￿ and such that 0 < l￿ < l. This
equilibrium implies a decrease in total royalties with respect to the absence of
patent pool.
12Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 ￿rstly establishes that a patent pool will always be created,
and that it won￿ t rally all patent owners if k ￿ 4 or x ￿ k = 3. The size k ￿ l￿
of the equilibrium patent pool is such that l￿ < l. This implies that the royalty
decreasing e⁄ects of the pool then dominate its royalty increasing e⁄ects. In the
end, the patent owners will split in two categories. On the one hand a group of
patent owners will join the pool and charge low royalties ￿rst hand in order to
derive pro￿ts from a larger number of licensees. On the other hand, the rest of
the patent owners will prefer to stay out of the pool in order to charge larger
royalties ex post.
It is worth insisting on the fact that this pattern corresponds to a stable
Nash equilibrium. In absence of a pool, some patent owners will always start
forming a pool to bene￿t of a ￿rst mover advantage. They will then be joined by
others until the equilibrium size is reached. Conversely, a grand patent pool will
always see some of its members drop out until the equilibrium size is reached. In
the end, the Nash stable patent pool will entail larger pro￿ts to its members and
non-members, by fostering the entry of more licensees, and by mitigating the
double marginalization problem. Since lower royalties and more entry imply
lower prices and more variety of end products, the formation of the ex ante
patent pool is also clearly bene￿cial to end consumers.
5 Conclusion
We have explored in this paper in what circumstances patent owners can be
expected to join unilaterally a patent pool. We have developed a simple model
in which owners of patents reading on a standard grant licences to competing
manufacturers. Assuming that manufacturers must sink a ￿xed cost to enter
the market for standard compliant products, we have compared two timings of
patent pool formation. We have shown that the formation of non-cooperative
patent pools nearly always fails if it takes place once manufacturers have in-
curred ￿xed costs. By contrast, a stable non-cooperative patent pool can emerge
ex ante if patent owners can make binding commitments to join it. We have
moreover shown that such an ex ante pool yields lower prices and higher licens-
ing pro￿ts than ex post patent pools would.
This analysis improves the understanding of patent pools in di⁄erent ways. It
￿rstly characterizes the hold out problem and its consequence, namely that non
cooperative patent pools cannot emerge at equilibrium in an ex post scenario. It
also highlights an intrinsinc ine¢ ciency of ex post patent pools, admitting they
can ￿x the double marginalization problem. When standards entail irreversible
adoption costs, such pools indeed fail in attracting enough licensees, because
of a hold-up problem. High royalties charged to captive licensees then result
in higher product prices and lower pro￿ts for licensors. This ￿nding has an
important implication. Provided it can make credible commitments, a patent
pool created at an earlier stage of the standard setting process - that is before
13manufacturers sink entry costs - allows licensors to promote entry. By generating
additional pro￿ts, this reinforces their incentives to join a pool. It thus facilitates
the spontaneous formation of pools that are both more e¢ cient and robust to
patent hold out.
These results have interesting policy implications concerning price discus-
sions in standard setting bodies. Until recently, antitrust authorities have been
suspicious about ex post patent pools, let alone early price discussion in standard
setting bodies. While the pro-e¢ ciency e⁄ects of patent pools have already been
demonstrated and accepted by antitrust authorities, our results suggest that
they should as well consider accepting, and even encouraging, early licensing
agreements in standard setting bodies. Besides the reluctance of public author-
ities, the absence of such agreements until very recently can also be explained
by other factors. Standard setting organizations have long been purely technical
bodies, and licensing issues have arised only recently, in the trail of the patent
surge they experienced. Another important factor deals with the credibility of
licensing commitments. Early price announcements would take place before all
future licensees can be identi￿ed, and therefore raise a problem of credibility.
Standard setting bodies may thus have an important role to play to enforce
such commitments. The recently adopted intellectual property policy of the
VITA standard setting body is a good illustration. VITA stands for VMEbus
International Trade Association; it creates standards for certain computer bus
architecture. Its policy includes a special provision that requires its members
to disclose maximum royalty rates they will demand for their essential patents.
If a patent owner fails to comply with his royalty commitment, he is forced to
license his intellectual property right on a royalty-free basis.
The analysis carried out in this paper has limitations that could be ad-
dressed in subsequent works. We have ￿rstly assumed that all patent owners
held symmetric patent portfolios, which may not be true in practise. Intro-
ducing asymmetric patents would not change the analysis of ex post licensing,
since all patent holders would still enjoy monopoly power on an essential input.
However, it may be interesting to introduce asymmetry in the analysis of the
ex ante patent pool. Allocating pro￿ts in function of the ex ante value of the
patents held by the pool￿ s members, as suggested by Swanson & Baumol (2005)
and Lemley & Shapiro (2007), would indeed modify their incentives to join the
pool. We can especially expect that ￿rms with larger patent portfolios would be
more willing to join an ex ante pool. We also assume that all patent owners are
pure R&D ￿rms that do not operate as manufacturers on the market for stan-
dard compliant products. This assumption contrasts with most standards in
which key patent owners are often also downstream manufacturers. Introducing
such vertically integrated ￿rms would certainly enrich the analysis. We have
also neglected the role of uncertainty in the licensing decision. By assuming
that patent owners could perfectly predict ex ante the size of the market for
standard compliant products and the future number of entrants, we have ruled
out a possible deterrent to ex ante licensing2.
2We have introduced uncertainty in another, simpler model with a unique licensor, and
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shown that licensing schemes based on royalty caps provide interesting compromises between
ex ante and ex post licensing (LØvŒque & MØniŁre, 2007).
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Proof of Proposition 1
The Proof is obvious as regards independent licensors. The derivative of the







(3l ￿ 2k + 2)x2
(k ￿ l)
2 (l + 2)
3 > 0
this expression is positive if:




The term on the left hand side is more increasing than the term on the right
hand side, its initial value is smaller (for l = 0) and its ￿nal value is larger (for
l = k).
Proof of Proposition 2
The initial case in which all patent owners license separately is de￿ned by l =
k ￿ 1 and ￿L
k￿1 = ￿P
k￿1 (e.g., the "pool" includes only one patent owner).
Starting from there, another patent owner has an incentive to join the pool if
￿P
k￿2 > ￿L






















2 > 2k2 () ￿k2 + 2k + 1 > 0
It can be checked easily that the polynom on the right hand side is negative
for all k ￿ 3, and positive only for k = 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Given a number l of independent licensors, a member of the pool has an incentive
to defect if ￿i
l > ￿
p

























k ￿ l + 1
(l + 2)
2 (10)
for l = 0, it can be checked easily that condition (10) holds only if k > 3.
In other terms, the grand coalition of all patent owners within a patent pool is
not stable if k > 2.
for l = 1 condition (10) writes k > 2:25, which also implies that a pool with
k ￿ 1 members is not stable i⁄ k > 2.





< k + 1 ￿ l (11)
The derivative wrt l of the right hand side is (￿1), while the derivative of the











l(l + 2)(l + 1) < 3
Hence the left hand side is more downward sloping than the right hand side for
all l ￿ 1. Since we also know that condition (11) holds for l = 1 when k > 2,
we can conclude that condition (11) also holds for l ￿ 1 when k > 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
It is obvious that ￿P













































The derivative of ￿A







(x ￿ l ￿ k ￿ kl ￿ kx + 2lx ￿ 1)(x ￿ l ￿ 1)
(l ￿ k)
2 (l + 1)
2





x ￿ l ￿ k ￿ kl ￿ kx + 2lx ￿ 1 < 0
We have:
x ￿ l ￿ k ￿ kl ￿ kx + 2lx ￿ 1 < 0
,
l <
(k ￿ 1)x + 1 + k
2x ￿ k ￿ 1
￿ l





x ￿ 1 < k(x + 1)










l is strictly decreasing on [0;k ￿ l] when x ￿ k
k￿1 (k + 1), and inverse-
U-shaped when x > k
k￿1 (k + 1).








































18When the ex ante patent pool includes all patent owners, the incentive for one




















> 0 for k > 3
ind for k = 3
< 0 for k = 2
This expression is positive if:













It can be checked easily that this is always true for k > 3, and never true
for k = 2. For k = 3, condition (12) rewrites:
￿x2 + 8x ￿ 16 = 0 > 0
This polynom has a unique root x￿ = 4. Hence when k = 3 the grand patent
pool is stable i⁄ x ￿ 3.












4l(k ￿ l + 1)
; l > 0










4l(k ￿ l + 1)





l3 (2x ￿ k ￿ 1) + l2 ￿




2x ￿ k ￿ 2x2 + x2 (k + 1) ￿ 1
￿
￿ x2 = 0
A Mapple solving of this polynom shows that it has a unique root in R. Given
that ￿P
l and ￿A
l￿1 are continuous on [1;k], that ￿P
1 > ￿A
0 (for k > 3) and that
￿A
l￿1 > ￿P




when k > 3.
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